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Introduction
The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
includes for the first time a chapter devoted to International Monetary
Law. Three topics are included in this chapter. The choice of them recalls
Winston Churchill's rejection of a pudding because it lacked theme. The
first topic is devoted largely to obligations of member states under the
Articles of Agreement (Articles) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
on exchange arrangements, exchange policies, and exchange rates. This
topic relates to the behavior of states ("members") and is wholly within
the field of public international law. No legal principle is involved that
compels members to intrude on the rights and duties of private parties.
Even if the exchange rate of a state's currency is in violation of that state's
obligations under the Articles of the IMF, the Articles do not provide
that the exchange rate is inapplicable to relations between private parties.
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The principle that the exchange rate does apply is a logical extrapolation
of the ratio decidendi of the English case Lively Ltd. v. City of Munich.2
The second topic relates to article VIII, section 2(b) of the IMF's
Articles, which deals with the unenforceability of certain contracts if the
conditions of the provision are met. The provision imposes an obligation
of public international law on states to ensure that their courts and ad-
ministrative agencies apply the provision, but here the provision does
require that there shall be an impact on contracting parties, whether
private or public. The provision displaces the application of certain prin-
ciples of private international law, but the Restatement does not consider
the question whether the provision itself is or is not a principle of private
international law. It follows that the Restatement does not discuss the
legal consequences of the answer to this question. In my view, the pro-
vision itself is not within the field of private international law.3 The un-
reported English case of American Express International Banking
Corporation v. Irvani should be regarded as incorrectly decided in holding
that a forum should forbear from applying its own view of the correct
interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b) in favor of the interpretation
that prevails under the proper law of the contract selected by the private
international law of the forum. 4
The third topic is devoted to the currency in which courts in the United
States express judgments on obligations in foreign currency, and the rate
of exchange to be chosen whenever an obligation in foreign currency must
be calculated in dollars. Nothing in the IMF's Articles imposes an obli-
gation on states in these matters. The topic is solely one of domestic
substantive law. The Restatement recognizes this fact, but justifies treat-
ment of the topic on the ground that it has become more important after
the collapse of the par value system established under the IMF's original
Articles and the de jure abrogation of the system by the Second Amend-
ment of the Articles, which became effective on April 1, 1978. The rights
and duties of litigants are directly affected by U.S. law without reference
to the IMF's Articles, although the Restatement declares that the selected
law of international economic relations included in the Restatement is
limited to rules that govern the behavior of states rather than of private
parties directly.
2. [1976] 3 All E.R. 851.
3. J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS, VOLUME II 555-90 (1986) [here-
inafter GOLD, VOLUME III].
4. Id. at 64-67.
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I. The Exchanges
Text of the Restatement. The first topic is discussed here under the
heading of "The Exchanges" because the provisions of the IMF's Articles
that are the subject matter of this topic contain a number of distinct
categories, each of which, as will be discussed below, bears a name that
begins with the word "exchange." The black-letter section of the Re-
statement on the exchanges is formulated as follows:
"§ 821 [851]. Obligations of Member States of the International Monetary Fund
Under the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund,(1) Member states are free to adopt any exchange arrangement of their choice
consistent with orderly economic growth and reasonable price stability, but
such arrangements may not
(a) be linked to gold, or
(b) involve multiple currency practices or discriminate against the currency
of any other member state, except with the approval of the Fund.
(2) Member states must cooperate with the Fund in its oversight of the in-
ternational monetary system
(a) by furnishing information to the Fund as required for surveillance of
their exchange rate policies, and
(b) by consulting with the Fund with respect to those policies periodically
and on request.
(3) Member states may not, without approval of the Fund, impose restrictions
on the making of payments or transfers for current international transactions,
unless they have reserved the right to avail themselves of transitional arrange-
ments including such restrictions.
(4) Member states may not manipulate exchange rates in order to prevent
effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain unfair competitive advan-
tage over other member states."
This text combines some elements of sections 1, 2, and 3 of article IV
and of article VIII, sections 2 and 3 of the IMF's Articles.
Article IV of IMF's Articles: Exchange arrangements. With the excep-
tion of subsections (l)(b) and (3), § 821 deals with some aspects of article
IV of the IMF's Articles. It is useful, therefore, to begin with an outline
of the provisions of Article IV in order to evaluate section 821.
Section 2 of article IV deals with "exchange arrangements" and Section
3 with "exchange rate policies." Section 1 deals primarily with "exchange
rates" and exchange rate policies. This distribution of subject matter is
not rigorously observed, because there is some overlapping among the
provisions. Furthermore, the concepts themselves are not precise, and
there are difficulties sometimes in classifying a particular exchange prac-
tice. Nevertheless, different norms apply to the three concepts. A further
point must be made. If article IV were constructed logically, section 2
might come first because of the concept of "exchange arrangements" and
because of the norm of members' freedom associated with it. The structure
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of article IV has been shaped, however, by a practical consideration.
Sections 1 and 3 apply whatever developments occur in the international
monetary system. Section 2(b), which establishes the freedom of members
to choose their exchange arrangements, is subject to a caveat and is not
conceived to be permanent. Both these aspects of the provision are dis-
cussed below.
In accordance with the logical order as suggested above, "exchange
arrangements" and section 2 of article IV will be discussed first. Under
the IMF's original Articles, the only exchange arrangement recognized
as an objective of the Articles was a par value for each member's currency
defined directly or indirectly in terms of gold as the common denominator
of the par value system. The present Articles, almost wholly rewritten
by the Second Amendment, permit members, according to article IV,
section 2, to choose the "exchange arrangements" they prefer. The ex-
amples that appear in the provision show that exchange arrangements are
conceived to be the broad framework of members' exchange systems. An
exchange system can be defined as the relationships of a member with
other countries through the medium of its currency. The stated examples
are the pegging of the international value of a currency to the special
drawing right (SDR)5 or to some other denominator of a member's choice,
and cooperative arrangements by which members peg their currencies to
the currency or currencies of other members. A leading example of the
latter arrangement is the European Monetary System, under which a
number of European currencies are linked to each other within a frame-
work of fixed, though adjustable, relationships, while not maintaining fixed
exchange rates (floating) against other currencies. Only one exchange
arrangement is prohibited: pegging the international value of a currency
to gold. The reason for the prohibition is that an objective of the Second
Amendment is to reduce the role of gold in the international monetary
system.
In practice, members have chosen a wide variety of exchange arrange-
ments. The IMF's tabulation of them lists ten separate categories, as well
as some of the variations within a number of them. 6 These categories are
not legally exhaustive, because members are free to adopt other exchange
arrangements. The tabulated categories have a certain normative effect,
because members are required by the Articles to inform the IMF promptly
of changes in their exchange arrangements.
5. The SDR is a reserve asset the IMF can issue to members to supplement the other
reserve assets members hold to support their currencies and for other purposes. It is also
the IMF's unit of account. It consists at present of a composite of specified amounts of five
major currencies.
6. See IMF ANNUAL REPORT 1986, at 74.
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The freedom of members to choose their exchange arrangements is
subject to the caveat that this freedom applies under an international
monetary system of the kind prevailing on January 1, 1976. There are two
explanations of this caveat. First, under article IV, section 2(c), to accord
with the development of the international monetary system, the IMF may
decide to recommend "general exchange arrangements" to its members
by decisions taken with eighty-five percent of the total weighted voting
power of members. Second, under article IV, section 4, the IMF may
determine, by the same majority of voting power, that the conditions exist
in which the par value system regulated by schedule C of the Articles
can operate effectively, whereupon the IMF must call that system into
operation.
Neither decision deprives members of the right to have an exchange
arrangement other than the general exchange arrangement recommended
by the IMF or a par value under schedule C. The high majority necessary
for the decisions implies that most members-or certainly those with
major roles in international trade and payments-will act in accordance
with a decision, either because the exchange arrangement will be fa-
vorable for them or because of the moral suasion of the decision. It is
for this latter reason that the United States supported the necessity for
the high majority. The weighted voting power of the United States
enables it to veto a proposed decision, and thus to ensure that the
United States will not consider itself pressed to participate in a system
that might be as unfair to it as, in its view, the original par value system
had become.
Exchange arrangements are put into operation with "exchange rate
policies," which can be considered the actions, or the inactivity, of the
monetary authorities of a member that affect the exchange rate of its
currency. The exchange rate of a currency can be regarded as the resulting
price of the currency in terms of other currencies.
Exchange rate and exchange policies. At this point, it is convenient to
take up section 1 of article IV. This provision sets forth obligations of
members that are both substantive and, as noted already, permanent.
Section 1 is difficult to apprehend, because of both the complexity of its
economic underpinning and its ambiguities. It must be quoted in full:
General obligations of members
Recognizing that the essential purpose of the international monetary system
is to provide a framework that facilitates the exchange of goods, services, and
capital among countries, and that sustains sound economic growth, and that a
principal objective is the continuing development of the orderly underlying
conditions that are necessary for financial and economic stability, each member
undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure orderly
exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates. In
particular, each member shall:
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(i) endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward the objec-
tive of fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability,
with due regard to its circumstances;
(ii) seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and
financial conditions and a monetary system that does not tend to produce
erratic disruptions;
(iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system
in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain
an unfair competitive advantage over other members; and
(iv) follow exchange policies compatible with the undertakings under this
Section.
One of the obscurities in the provision is the intended difference be-
tween "the essential purpose" and "a principal objective," but it is not
rewarding in the brief space of this article to attempt a clarification. The
reason is that the language beginning with the participle "Recognizing"
that precedes the phrase "each member undertakes" does not have nor-
mative force. To have recast this language in the form of an obligation
would have extended the obligations of members, and amplified the reg-
ulatory jurisdiction of the IMF, far beyond the traditional purview of the
IMF and the willingness of members to concede such authority. One
consequence would have been to extend the IMF's authority into the
territory of trade; another consequence would have been a conflict with
the freedom of members under article VI, section 3 to control capital
transfers. The language cannot be dismissed as wholly without effect. It
could be given the legal value of a preamble, to which resort might be
possible to help resolve an ambiguity. To the extent that obligations are
imposed on members in relation to "the essential purpose" and "the
principal objective," the obligations are to be found in the text that follows
the quasi-preambular language.
The fundamental norm of article IV, section I is the undertaking of
each member to collaborate with the IMF and with other members in the
pursuit of two objectives: orderly exchange arrangements and a stable
system of exchange rates. The second of these objectives is intended to
be a substitute for the concept of "exchange stability" in the original
Articles because that concept degenerated in practice into exchange ri-
gidity. Par values were not changed when they should have been. This
inflexibility contributed to the collapse of the original par value system.
The revised language is intended to convey the thought that exchange
rates should be allowed to change so that they are in accord with the
underlying conditions prescribed in the provision. Exchange rates will
then contribute to the creation of orderly underlying conditions. If con-
ditions are orderly, a stable system of exchange rates can be achieved.
Such a system can be maintained without crisis of the kind that brought
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about the collapse of the par value system, and without the need for
further amendment of the Articles on exchange rates.
Section I then lists four clauses that impose further obligations on
members. These obligations are prefaced by the words "In particular,
each member shall." The obligations can be considered more specific
applications of the broad undertaking of members to collaborate with the
IMF and among themselves.
The first two clauses are drafted in a style that differs from that of the
other two clauses. The clue to the difference is that the first two clauses
apply to domestic policies. They are included in the provision, however,
because they can have indirect effects on exchange rates. The other two
clauses apply to policies that directly affect exchange rates. 7 In view of
this difference, the first two clauses are drafted in a precatory rather than
a mandatory style. Members are not bound to achieve a certain result;
they are urged to try to achieve the result. The initial verbs "endeavor"
and "seek" set the tone. Members were reluctant to undertake obligations
that would constitute firm limitations on their discretion to choose do-
mestic policies. A major influence in the negotiation of article IV was the
determination of the United States to have freedom to pursue the domestic
policies of its choice without the constraint of an obligation to maintain
fixed rates for the dollar. Exchange policies and exchange rates are in-
dubitably within the international terrain, and if domestic policies affect
them, obligations could not be resisted in principle, but they could be
made so subjective that it would be difficult to insist that they were not
being performed.
Clauses (i) and (ii) can be classified as "soft law" in the language of
modern international law. The initial verbs of clauses (iii) and (iv) are firm
directions ("avoid" and "follow"). Members are not urged to try to avoid
or follow: they must avoid or follow.
The phrase "In particular" creates a problem of interpretation. Is the
list of the four specific obligations complete, or could the IMF evoke
further obligations from the undertaking of collaboration by members?
The phrase should not be interpreted to give the IMF this authority.
Traditionally, the exchange rate for a country's currency has been con-
sidered an inherent element of the country's sovereignty. It is reasonable
7. An obvious example would be a member's policies on intervention in its exchange
market or understandings among members that exchange rates for their currencies were
broadly consistent with economic fundamentals (see the statement of the Group of Seven
issued on Apr. 8, 1987). If these members went further and established target zones for
exchange rates, which therefore they would defend by intervention and other policies, the
understanding could be considered an exchange arrangement. These examples illustrate the
difficulties of classification.
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to conclude that clear evidence is necessary to establish that an inter-
national obligation that limits this sovereignty has been undertaken. A
decision by the IMF that purported to draw another specific obligation
from the obligation to collaborate could be taken by a majority of the
votes cast, as the majority for decisions whenever a special majority is
not prescribed by the Articles. 8 It would be difficult to reconcile the
conclusion that the Fund could take such a decision with the caution,
particularly on the part of the United States, that has made the majority
of eighty-five percent necessary for certain decisions affecting the freedom
of members that the IMF can take under article IV or schedule C.
Nothing that has been said here about the problem of interpretation
raised by the phrase "In particular" should be understood to deny the
IMF authority to clarify for members what conduct by them would be
consistent with the undertaking to collaborate, particularly in relation to
changes in international economic conditions. Throughout its history, the
IMF has held the view that it is authorized to specify the conduct by
members that would be compatible with other obligations to collaborate
imposed on members by the Articles. These decisions, however, did not
constitute distinct obligations. If a member did not conduct itself in ac-
cordance with a decision on the form that collaboration should take, the
member was not necessarily deemed to be violating its obligation to col-
laborate. The member was able to show that, in its particular circum-
stances, the conduct it was pursuing was nevertheless consistent with the
undertaking to collaborate.
Surveillance over exchange rate policies. The IMF is directed by section
3(a) of article IV to oversee the international monetary system in order
to ensure its effective operation, and to oversee the compliance of each
member with its obligations under section I of article IV. To fulfill its
functions, the IMF must exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate
policies of members and must adopt specific principles for the guidance
of all members with respect to those policies. 9 Each member must provide
the IMF with the information necessary for surveillance and must consult
with the IMF on the member's exchange rate policies.
Comment (c) to section 821 mistakenly assumes that specific principles
become obligations. Principles are not obligations unless they restate ob-
ligations included in the Articles. The word "guidance" is a term of art
in the IMF that has this connotation. It follows that the failure of a member
to act in accordance with a specific principle is not in itself a breach of
obligation.
8. Art. XII, § 5(c).
9. Comment (b) of § 821 states that as of 1985, "the relevant principles had not been
fully elaborated," which mistakenly implies that there is a preordained complete code.
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Growth andprice stability. Subsection (1) of section 821 is not consistent
with article IV, section I of the IMF's Articles. The subsection makes a
member's freedom to choose its exchange arrangement subject to the
condition that the choice is "consistent with orderly economic growth
and reasonable price stability." No such condition appears in article IV.
The words "orderly economic growth" and "reasonable price stability"
appear in clause (i) of article IV, section 1, but they are connected by the
word "with," and not the word "and" as in the Restatement. The primary
emphasis in the provision is placed on "orderly economic growth" to
placate developing countries. They feared that too much emphasis was
being placed on financial stability, and that the effect might be to impede
their pursuit of development. "Reasonable price stability" therefore, is
not an aim that is equal in emphasis to "orderly economic growth," as
is implied by the Restatement's substitution of "and" for "with." "Rea-
sonable price stability" had to be accepted as a brake on "orderly eco-
nomic growth," which was in any event implicit in "orderly," but not as
a prime objective, at least for developing countries. Such are the subtle
dangers of paraphrase.
The misconstruction discussed above is the result of a nuance in the text
of article IV, section 1, but two other features of subsection (1) of section
821 should have been obvious as mistakes. First, clause (i) of article IV,
section 1 of the Articles ends with the words "with due regard to its circum-
stances," but they have been deleted in the black-letter of the Restatement.
These words also were introduced into the provision of the Articles to pla-
cate developing countries. The IMF's doctrine of the uniform rights and
obligations of members prevented any mention of developing countries, but
the words were inserted in clause (i) to reassure them that their special cir-
cumstances would be taken into account in assessing whether they were
observing the obligation imposed by clause (i). In deference to the doctrine
of uniformity, the qualification of due regard to the circumstances of mem-
bers applies to all members, including the United States.
The second egregious error is the transformation of the soft obligation
of clause (i) into a firm condition that limits a member's choice of exchange
arrangement. The obligation is one of extraordinary softness. Almost
every word or phrase is tentative: "endeavor," "direct . . . toward,"
"objective," "fostering," and, of course, "with due regard to its circum-
stances." But whether soft or firm in formulation, clause (i) is not a
condition for the choice by members of their exchange arrangements. It
should not take much insight to see that there is no logic by which the
domestic policies referred to in clause (i) should control the choice of
exchange arrangements.
If, however, clause (i) is thought to be such a condition, why should
not all the other obligations of article IV, section 1 be similar conditions?
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The obligation imposed by clause (i) has no legal quality superior to the
obligations imposed by the other three clauses or to the obligation of
members to collaborate.
The drafters of the Restatement might point to some language in article
IV, sections 2(c) and 3(b) of the IMF's Articles to defend their paraphrase.
Section 2(c) refers to "the right of members to have exchange arrange-
ments of their choice consistent with the purposes of the Fund and the
obligations under Section I of this Article" and section 3(b) to "exchange
arrangements of a member's choice consistent with the purposes of the
Fund and Section I of this Article."
The purposes of the IMF are stated in article I and make no mention
of orderly economic growth and reasonable price stability as purposes of
the IMF. "Development of the productive resources of all members" is
referred to as one of the "primary objectives of economic policy." These
objectives, however, are not purposes, but the desired consequences of
"the expansion and balanced growth of international trade," which is a
purpose. This thought is conveyed by the words "and to contribute
thereby," which follow the purpose related to trade and precede the men-
tion of the development of productive resources. 10 The drafting of this
purpose is another example of resistance to the mention of developing
countries as a category of members deserving special treatment not ac-
corded to all members. I I The source of this resistance is concern that the
IMF might be transformed into a development institution. The World Bank
was created for that purpose at the same time as the IMF. Nothing that
has been said here should suggest that orderly economic growth and
reasonable price stability are contrary to the IMF's purposes: on the
contrary, they are among the ends to be achieved by means of the IMF's
purposes.
The language in article IV, sections 2(c) and 3(b) that establishes the
freedom of members to choose their exchange arrangements couples men-
tion of the IMF's purposes with references to article IV, section 1 and to
the obligations of members under that provision. These references to
article IV, section I cannot justify the drafting of subsection I of section
821. The only obligation relating to, and the only mention of, orderly
economic growth or reasonable price stability occurs in clause (i) of article
IV, section 1, and the drafting of that clause is nothing like the drafting
of subsection I of section 821.
10. "(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real
income and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary
objectives of economic policy." (Art. 1).
1I. J. GOLD, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS 477-80 (1979).
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There remains the question of the effect of the language in sections 2(b)
and 3(c) of article IV that refers to the purposes of the IMF and article
IV, section 1. The question does not really arise on the Restatement,
because the words are not incorporated into section 821. Elsewhere, I
have explained that the words limit not a member's choice among ex-
change arrangements but its choice of exchange policies or other policies
that affect the exchange rate of the member's currency. 12 Suppose, for
example, that the IMF decided, as it could by a majority of the votes
cast, that the United States was not complying with its obligation under
clause (i) of article IV, section 1, and was failing to achieve orderly eco-
nomic growth with reasonable price stability. It would be an absurdity to
conclude that the United States was then bound to forgo its choice of a
floating dollar as its exchange arrangement. It would be an equal absurdity
to hold that, as the result of a similar decision, France was bound to
withdraw from the European Monetary System. It would not be absurd
for the IMF to urge these members to modify their policies while they
continue to maintain the exchange arrangements of their choice.
Manipulation. Subsection (4) of section 821 provokes two criticisms.
First, it is intended to reflect the obligation that appears in clause (iii) of
article IV, section I of the IMF's Articles. The obligation to collaborate
and the obligations in the other three clauses of article IV, section I are
overlooked by section 821.
Second, the obligation in subsection (4) of section 821 is a truncated
version even of the obligation in clause (iii) of article IV, section 1. Sub-
section (4) of section 821 declares that members may not manipulate
exchange rates in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjust-
ment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members.
This formulation omits the prohibition of manipulating the international
monetary system. That prohibition is associated with gaining an unfair
competitive advantage over other members. Only some members are pow-
erful enough to manipulate the international monetary system to gain an
unfair competitive advantage over other members. Therefore, the manip-
ulation of exchange rates in order to prevent effective balance of payments
adjustment was included in clause (iii) so as to impose an obligation on
other members that was somewhat comparable but more suitable to their
economic status. In principle, however, though not in fact, both obliga-
tions bind all members, again because of the doctrine of uniform rights
and obligations.
Other prohibited practices. Subsections (1)(b) and (3) of section 821 are
flawed reflections of sections 3 and 2, respectively, of article VIII of the
12. GOLD, VOLUME III, supra note 3, at 683-85.
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IMF's Articles. These provisions of the Articles prohibit three categories
of measures: multiple currency practices, discriminatory currency ar-
rangements, and restrictions on payments and transfers for current in-
ternational transactions as defined in article XXX(d) of the Articles. For
some reason that is not made clear by the Restatement, the first two
categories are presented as limitations on the freedom of members to
choose their exchange arrangements, but not the third category.
The treatment of each category is inadequate. It is not stated that the
Fund has left open the question whether a special exchange rate for capital
transactions creates a multiple currency practice for which the approval
of the IMF is necessary under article VIII, section 3 of the Articles. Nor
is it stated that the IMF has decided that discrimination in relation to
capital transactions is not a discriminatory currency arrangement for which
the approval of the IMF is necessary under the same provision, except,
perhaps, if the discrimination is in exchange rates.
Discriminatory currency arrangements are described in section 821 as
discrimination by a member "against the currency of any other member
state." Insofar as discrimination is of this character, it should be under-
stood that the discrimination may be directly unfavorable to another mem-
ber or other members, or directly favorable to another member or other
members and therefore indirectly unfavorable to the rest.
A serious objection to the description of discriminatory currency ar-
rangements in the Restatement is that they need not discriminate against
the currency of another member. It would be more accurate to describe
them as a member's measures that discriminate against another member
or other members through the medium of the exchange system. An al-
ternative description would be measures that discriminate by means of
unequal treatment relating to currency. A discriminating member may
discriminate against another member by arrangements involving the dis-
criminating member's own currency. For example, the discriminating
member may freeze another member's holdings of the discriminating
member's currency. Furthermore, a discrimination against a member may
relate to all currencies. For example, the discriminating member may
forbid its residents to make payments and transfers in any currency to
residents of the member discriminated against.
Subsection (3) of section 821, which deals with restrictions, contains a
caveat in favor of members that "have reserved the right to avail them-
selves of transitional arrangements including such restrictions." The ca-
veat is poorly drafted. The transitional arrangements of article XIV of
the IMF's Articles apply only to restrictions on payments and transfers
for current international transactions, so that the word "including" should
not be understood or bring other practices into the embrace of the tran-
sitional arrangements.
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A member availing itself of the transitional arrangements may never-
theless require the approval of the IMF for some restrictions. Approval
will be necessary for a member's restrictions that were not in effect when
the country entered the IMF or that cannot be considered adaptations of
such restrictions.
Restatement and treaty provisions. There is a story that Mozart, after
playing a new composition, was asked what he meant by it, whereupon
he sat down and played it again. Enough has been said to show the dangers
of paraphrasing the text of treaty provisions and presenting the redraft
as if it had some authenticity. Would it not be more helpful to those who
use the Restatement if the authentic text were reproduced and paraphrase
included in the Reporters' Notes? 13 In presenting the provisions of trea-
ties, the drafters of the Restatement should be musicologists and not
composers.
II. Unenforceable "Exchange Contracts"
The provision and its official interpretation. Article VIII, section 2(b)
of the IMF's Articles is formulated as follows:
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which
are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or
imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the terri-
tories of any member. In addition, members may, by mutual accord, cooperate
in measures for the purpose of making the exchange control regulations of either
member more effective, provided that such measures and regulations are con-
sistent with this Agreement.
The Restatement has paraphrased as follows the first sentence of this
provision:
§ 822 [852]. Exchange Controls and Exchange Contracts in Courts of Member
States
Member states of the International Monetary Fund may not enforce exchange
contracts involving the currency of another member state if such contracts are
contrary to that state's exchange control regulations maintained or imposed
consistently with the Articles of Agreement of the Fund.
This text creates no serious problems because of reformulation, but if
the purpose of paraphrase by the Restatement is an exact clarification of
the law, the reformulation sheds no light on the manifold difficulties of
understanding the first sentence of article VIII, section 2(b). The Re-
porters may have avoided clarification by the black-letter provision be-
cause the IMF has issued only a limited interpretation of article VIII,
section 2(b), and because the courts of members have not adopted uniform
13. On the Comment and the Reporters' Notes on § 821, caveat lector: there are many
errors in the account of the law and practice of the IMF.
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decisions. The condition of U.S. case law may be another reason. Legal
analysis of the provision by courts in the United States has been thin,
and it may be that the Reporters disapprove of what appears to be the
prevailing sentiment of the courts and of the legal profession in the United
States. Virtual reproduction of the text of the provision, with no expres-
sion of a recommended interpretation by the Reporters, may have seemed
the better part of valor.
Interpretation by the IMF has been mentioned above. The IMF is au-
thorized by article XXIX of its Articles to settle with finality issues of
interpretation of the Articles arising between members or between the
IMF and a member. The IMF's only direct interpretation of article VIII,
section 2(b) was adopted on June 10, 1949, under the predecessor of the
present article XXIX. The decision declared the "meaning and effect"
of the first sentence of article VIII, section 2(b) to be as follows:
I. Parties entering into exchange contracts involving the currency of any
member of the Fund and contrary to exchange control regulations of that
member which are maintained or imposed consistently with the Fund Agree-
ment will not receive the assistance of the judicial or administrative author-
ities of other members in obtaining the performance of such contracts. That
is to say, the obligations of such contracts will not be implemented by the
judicial or administrative authorities of member countries, for example by
decreeing performance of the contracts or by awarding damages for their
nonperformance.
2. By accepting the Fund Agreement members have undertaken to make
the principle mentioned above effectively part of their national law. This
applied to all members, whether or not they have availed themselves of the
transitional arrangements of Article XIV, Section 2.
An obvious result of the foregoing undertaking is that if a party to an exchange
contract of the kind referred to in Article VIII, Section 2(b) seeks to enforce
such a contract, the tribunal of the member country before which the proceed-
ings are brought will not, on the ground that they are contrary to the public
policy (ordre public) of the forum, refuse recognition of the exchange control
regulations of the other member which are maintained or imposed consistently
with the Fund Agreement. It also follows that such contracts will be treated as
unenforceable notwithstanding that under the private international law of the
forum, the law under which the foreign exchange control regulations are main-
tained or imposed is not the law which governs the exchange contract or its
performance. 14
The effects of article VIII, section 2(b), as clarified by the interpretation,
on problems of the choice of law when the provision is applicable need
give the Reporters of the Restatement no difficulty, and no further ex-
plication is necessary. The difficulty, however, is to determine when the
provision does apply.
14. For the full text. see the IMF SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MON-
ETARY FUND AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 13TH ISSUE 290-91 (1987) [hereinafter SELECTED
DECISIONS].
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Rationale of provision. Interpretation of Article VIII, section 2(b) should
be guided by the principle that as the provision appears in an economic
treaty, the economic rationale of the provision must be taken into account.
The provision should make economic sense within the context of the
treaty. Courts in the United States have not followed this procedure and
instead have concentrated on the mechanical application of what they
take to be clear language.
To invoke the economic character of the provision does not provide an
automatic solution of the problem of interpretation. The economic ra-
tionale of the provision is not obvious, but the Restatement does not
attempt an analysis of it. What, then, is the rationale?
The first possibility is that the provision is related to the maintenance
of rates of exchange as determined by the monetary authorities of mem-
bers. Evidence exists15 that the provision originated in a proposal by the
United States to placate the British delegation at the Bretton Woods Con-
ference of July 1944, from which the Articles emerged. The British del-
egation feared that the adamant refusal of the United States to undertake
an obligation to police its exchange market might result in a discount for
sterling. Discount in this sense meant a depreciation of sterling in the
market below the parity between the dollar and sterling derived from the
par values of the two currencies established under the IMF's Articles.
To prevent this depreciation, the United Kingdom would have to use its
holdings of gold and dollars to support the exchange rate for sterling, but
they would be exiguous after World War II. To allay British concern, the
United States proposed the forerunner of article VIII, section 2(b). Orig-
inally, therefore, the provision was related to defense of the par value
system, and indeed in early drafts presented at the Conference the pro-
vision appeared in the proposed article on exchange rates. Some members
of the British delegation saw that this maneuver was wholly inadequate
to deal with British anxiety, because exchange rates would be determined
by executed contracts on which suits would not be brought.
Before the end of the Bretton Woods Conference, the proposed Article
VIII, section 2(b) was redrafted and moved from the exchange rate pro-
visions to the place in the Articles it has had in the original Articles and
in the Amendments of 1969 and 1978. The par value system was abrogated
by the Second Amendment. It was a sweeping modification of the Articles
in which few provisions were not amended. An objective of the Amend-
ment was modernization of the Articles, as it was called. Article VIII,
section 2(b), however, was retained with no change at all.
The conclusion must be that the economic purpose of the provision is
not support for official exchange rates. The decisions of U.S. and some
15. J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS, VOLUME 11 429-38 (1982).
SPRING 1988
18 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
other courts on the meaning of "exchange contracts" would have an
economic rationale only if the defense of official exchange rates was the
purpose of the provision.
A second possibility is that article VIII, section 2(b) is to be understood
not on the basis of the protection of exchange rates but of international
trade. The argument in favor of this analysis would run that a purpose of
the IMF, according to article I(ii), is to "facilitate the expansion and
balanced growth of international trade." Therefore, the exchange control
regulations referred to in article VIII, section 2(b) cannot be regulations
that deal with payments and transfers for merchandise transactions and
must be regulations that apply to contracts for the exchange of currencies.
This analysis would not deserve serious notice except that it is the ratio
decidendi in a leading English case, Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v.
Terruzzi,16 which has been endorsed by the House of Lords in United
City Merchants (Investments) Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada. 17
The fallacies in this approach should be obvious. For example, it implies
that trade transactions are always beneficial for a country. The IMF,
however, is authorized to approve restrictions on payments and transfers
of whatever character that the IMF considers appropriate in a member's
circumstances. The IMF has often approved restrictions on payments and
transfers for some trade transactions-such as the importation of luxury
items-when a member was in balance of payments disequilibrium. Fur-
thermore, trade is only one of the six purposes of the IMF, another of
which is to help members overcome maladjustment in their balances of
payments, in which condition temporary exchange controls may be
necessary.
A third possible rationale might be that article VIII, section 2(b) is
related in some way to the IMF's purpose of assisting in the establishment
of the multilateral system of payments and transfers in respect of current
transactions, or, as it is sometimes described, the convertibility of cur-
rencies for current transactions. The implication of this rationale would
be that members should avoid or eliminate exchange controls that impede
such an open system, but that temporary derogations might be authorized
by the Articles (for example, under the transitional arrangements) or
approved ad hoc by the IMF (for example, when a member is suffering
an exchange crisis). Article VIII, section 2(b) would apply, therefore,
exclusively to restrictions on payments and transfers for current inter-
national transactions and not to controls on capital transfers.18
16. [19761 I Q.B. 683.
17. [19821 2 All E.R. 720.
18. In addition, the provision would apply to nonrestrictive controls, to which members
attach importance for various reasons.
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An objection to the third possible rationale is once again its narrowness.
To reject so narrow a view, it is sufficient to recall the monetary history
of the period between the two World Wars that induced states to take the
radical step of creating an international monetary system with the IMF
at its center. The "hot money" flows of capital in the period had produced
such disequilibrium in balances of payments and such instability of ex-
change rates that agreement was reached to authorize members to control
capital transfers without the need for the IMF's approval even in a newly
organized international monetary system.' 9 If members were going to
cooperate by recognizing each other's exchange controls, there could be
no reasonable justification for the exclusion of capital controls. On the
contrary, the authorization of capital controls without the necessity for
the IMF's approval of them might suggest that there was a stronger case
for cooperation in relation to them than in relation to other exchange
controls.
Another economic rationale, often advanced by authors and European
courts, is that article VIII, section 2(b) is intended to protect the resources
of a country. The weakness of this fourth rationale is the implication that
the provision is designed to prevent reduction, or to ensure increase, in
the economic resources, or more precisely the monetary reserve assets
of the monetary authorities, of a country. Exchange controls are often
adopted to serve such objectives, but exchange controls may be designed
for other purposes, including sometimes the prevention of increases in
monetary reserves. Controls may be imposed on capital inflow for various
reasons, such as the desire to prevent the domestic monetary conse-
quences of inflow or to cooperate with countries that would suffer capital
outflow.
A fifth economic rationale has been offered that closely resembles the
fourth rationale: protection of a member's balance of payments. This view
is open to somewhat the same criticisms that are made above of the fourth
possible rationale. In its practice, the IMF recognizes, and often approves,
restrictions that a member applies for reasons not related to improvement
of its balance of payments. The restrictions may have some other eco-
nomic purpose, 20 or they may have a noneconomic purpose, such as the
preservation of national or international security.2'
One should arrive, therefore, at the sixth, and the appropriate, version
of the economic rationale of article VIII, section 2(b). It is that the pro-
19. Art. VI, § 3 is the basic provision authorizing members to impose capital controls.
They are authorized, in addition, by Art. VI, § I (on the request of the IMF) and by Art.
VII, § 3(b) (on the IMF's formal declaration of the scarcity of a currency).
20. SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 14, at 297.
21. Id. at 275-76.
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vision relates to the exchange controls of other members on payments
and transfers for current international transactions or on international
capital movements that affect the balance of payments of the foreign
promulgator of the controls. In other words, the provision applies to
exchange controls that regulate payments and transfers, whether for cur-
rent or capital transactions, between residents and nonresidents of the
promulgator. Guidance on the compilation of members' balances of pay-
ments can be found in the IMF's Balance of Payments Manual.22
This economic rationale of the provision is consistent with the essential
character of the IMF as an organization concerned with the balances of
payments of its members. The IMF's concern embraces the balance of
payments as a whole, which is to say, all the items that enter into the
balance of payments. Article VIII, section 2(b) requires members to co-
operate, in accordance with the provision, on the exchange regulations
by which members control their balances of payments, provided that the
regulations are consistent with the Articles because the regulations are
authorized by the Articles or are approved by the IMF.
"Exchange contracts." Exchange contracts can justly be considered
the central element in article VIII, section 2(b). Paragraph (b) of the
Comment on section 822 notes that nowhere in the IMF's Articles is there
a definition of this concept, but that at least two distinct interpretations
have emerged in judicial decisions and writings. The narrow view is that
the concept embraces only contracts for the exchange of means of pay-
ment in different currencies, or, to put it baldly, the exchange of one
currency for another. The broader view is that the concept "might be
applied also to other contracts, including contracts for international sale
of goods, charter of ships, deposit of funds and similar transactions that
have an effect on the balance of payments or exchange resources of the
member state imposing the exchange control." This statement of the
broader view is strangely tentative, for example, in its use of the verb
"might be applied" and in its failure to state forthrightly that all contracts
are embraced if they would have an effect on the balance of payments.
The Comment discloses no preference of the Institute on the meaning of
the term, and therefore departs from Tentative Draft No. 5, in which the
Institute supported what was substantially the broader view.
An economic rationale for the narrow view would be something like
the first of the six referred to earlier, although courts that have supported
this view usually have done so without discussion and for the strictly
linguistic reason, stated abruptly by the courts, that everyone knows that
an exchange contract is a contract for the exchange of currencies. These
22. (4th ed. 1977).
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courts have not noticed that they are making the word "exchange" per-
form a double duty: exchange as currency and exchange as the act of
trading something for something else.
The narrow view reduces the provision to triviality. The reason for this
criticism is not only that exchange contracts would be one among innu-
merable categories of contracts that would have similar economic con-
sequences from the standpoint of the IMF. In addition, this single category
of contracts is unlikely to be the subject of suit in foreign courts. The
contracts would usually be made between a bank and a customer that are
residents of the same member country. The exchange control regulations
of another member would not be involved. The only regulations that might
be relevant would be those of the country in which the contracting parties
were resident, but article VIII, section 2(b) does not apply to the regu-
lations of the lexfori. The Articles do not compel a member to cooperate
with itself.
The purposes of the IMF relate to the macroeconomic policies of its
members and not to individual categories of contracts or transactions.
The-broader view of "exchange contracts" referred to by the Comment
should mean contracts that call for payments and transfers for current
international transactions or for movements of capital. "Contracts" mean
all such contracts. "Exchange" means the payments and transfers or
capital transfers that would be made in the currency of any member or
nonmember, whether it be the currency of the promulgator of the regu-
lations or a foreign currency. The word "exchange" is appropriate be-
cause the payments, etc., are made internationally.
To interpret "exchange contracts" as a concept that goes beyond pay-
ments, transfers, and movements of capital to mean payments, etc., that
have an effect on the balance of payments or exchange resources of a
member makes the word "exchange" in the provision otiose. The function
of affecting the balance of payments is performed by the phrase "involve
the currency of any member." The word "exchange" in "exchange con-
tracts" becomes even more obviously redundant under the narrow inter-
pretation of them as contracts for the purchase and sale of one currency
against another.
Courts in the United States have favored the narrow interpretation for
reasons of policy. The narrow view is highly restrictive, and such contracts
are not likely to be the subject of suit. U.S. financial markets can be
safeguarded against foreign legal interference that would receive a laissez-
passer under a broad interpretation. It becomes possible also to protect
domestic creditors. 23 Nevertheless, it may be that close inspection would
23. See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.
1985), in which, however, the court did not discuss art. ViII, § 2(b).
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show little, if any, solid authority in the case law of the United States for
the narrow interpretation. Expressions of support for such an interpre-
tation in some of the most prominent cases are no more than obiter dicta.
For example, the endorsement of that interpretation in J. Zeevi and Sons
Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd. was obiter,24 because the Ugandan
regulations in issue in the case were not approved by the IMF or au-
thorized by the Articles. Furthermore, as they amounted to confiscation,
they were not exchange control regulations. In Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco
Nacional de Libra S.A., 25 the court held that the defendants had not
proved that the exchange control regulations of Costa Rica were "main-
tained or imposed consistently with the Articles."
"Involve the currency." It will be apparent from the discussion of "ex-
change contracts" that the expression does not indicate the member whose
exchange control regulations are to be respected under article VIII, sec-
tion 2(b). That member is the one whose balance of payments would be
affected if the court enforced an exchange contract. This is the economic
meaning of the phrase "involve the currency of any member." It should
be added that the promulgator of the regulations must have internationally
recognized jurisdiction to prescribe them in order to benefit from the
provision.
The narrow view of exchange contracts leads readily to the interpre-
tation that the currency involved under article VIII, section 2(b) is a
currency that is traded for another currency. This interpretation produces
strange distinctions for which no economic justification can be advanced.
A contract for the sale of French francs for sterling "involves" both
currencies under this view, and French exchange control regulations would
be respected under article VIII, section 2(b) because the franc was in-
volved, but a contract for a loan in French francs repayable in French
francs (or another currency) would be deemed not to "involve" the franc.
The result would not be different under the narrow view even if the first
contract did not affect France's balance of payments and the second
contract did.
Consistency with IMF's Articles. Article VIII, section 2(b) applies only
if the exchange control regulations on which a party relies are "maintained
or imposed consistently with" the IMF's Articles. The Comment on sec-
tion 822 properly distinguishes between restrictions that require the ap-
proval of the IMF and those that are authorized by the Articles and
therefore do not require approval. The Comment does not make the point
that "exchange control regulations" can be either restrictive or nonre-
strictive and that article VIII, section 2(b) applies to both.
24. 37 N.Y.2d 220, 333 N.E.2d 168 (1975).
25. 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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The Comment states that as the consistency of a particular exchange
restriction with the Articles often cannot be determined simply by inter-
preting the Articles, it may be necessary for a court to seek the advice
of the IMF before passing on the question. It is doubtful, however, whether
the consistency of restrictions with the Articles is ever a question of simply
interpreting the Articles. But it is sufficient to note here that the Comment
poses the issue of consistency with the Articles as one that faces a court
when the problem is not simply interpretation of the Articles. The Com-
ment then draws a distinction between two responses of the IMF. If the
IMF states that a particular regulation is not maintained or imposed con-
sistently with the Articles, the statement is conclusive. If the IMF states
that the regulation is maintained or imposed consistently with the Articles,
the statement is entitled to great weight, but the court is required to make
the final decision.
The distinction is insupportable for a number of reasons. It is animated
by a tenderness for plaintiffs, and denies equal justice for defendants.
Justice should require either that all statements are conclusive or that all
statements are no more than persuasive. Furthermore, to hold that state-
ments are not conclusive means, in view of the supposition that the issue
is not one of interpretation only, that the court is entitled to substitute
itself for the IMF in the administration of the IMF's regulatory jurisdiction.
There are other objections to the distinction made by the Restatement.
For example, the question of consistency with the Articles may require
a detailed knowledge of the history of a country's restrictive exchange
system for decades, to see, for example, whether the exchange control
regulation in issue is an adaptation of a regulation in force when a member
entered the IMF or is a regulation subsequently introduced. 26 Should the
court's view prevail over the IMF's practice on the distinction between
adaptation and introduction? The IMF's statement may be based on an
exercise of discretion under a particular policy of the IMF. Can a court
determine whether the policy, or the exercise of discretion under it, is
consistent with the Articles? The decision of the Fifth Circuit of Appeals
in Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A. 27 accepted as conclusive the IMF's statement
that certain regulations approved by the Fund were consistent with the
Articles. The distinction made by the Comment would mean that the
courts of each member could decide conclusively whether regulations
were consistent with the Articles. Only if the IMF's statements are treated
as conclusive can a uniform application among members be ensured of
this aspect of article VIII, section 2(b). A statement by the IMF is made
26. See art. XIV, § 2.
27. 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
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with the authority of the Executive Board of the IMF: the statement is a
decision of the IMF. Should it not be the public policy of courts in the
United States to support decisions of the IMF?
III. Foreign Currency Obligations and Judgments
Text of the Restatement. The third topic of monetary law appears in
the following provision:
§ 823 [853]. Obligations in Foreign Currency: Law of the United States
(I) Courts in the United States ordinarily give judgment on causes of action
arising in another state, or denominated in a foreign currency, in United States
dollars, but they are not precluded from giving judgment in the currency in
which the obligation is denominated or the loss was incurred.
(2) If the court gives judgment in dollars in accordance with Subsection (1),
the conversion is to be made at such rate as to make the creditor whole and to
avoid rewarding a debtor who has delayed in carrying out the obligation.
The principle as stated here is not confined to contractual claims but
includes, for example, claims in tort. The Comment recognizes that the
traditional American rule has been that courts in the United States can
render money judgments only in U.S. dollars, but the Comment finds no
legal impediment to the expression of judgments in a foreign currency in
appropriate circumstances. The Comment holds that in a world in which
the U.S. dollar and all major currencies fluctuate against each other, courts
should be able to issue judgments in a foreign currency, if two conditions
are satisfied: judgment in this form (a) is requested by the judgment cred-
itor, and (b) will best accomplish the objective of subsection (2). Condition
(b) is intended to mean that the judgment expressed in foreign currency
will make the creditor whole and avoid benefit to the judgment debtor
who has unjustifiably delayed payment. If a judgment is expressed in a
foreign currency, the Comment states that the debtor may satisfy the
judgment either by payment in that currency or by payment of an equiv-
alent amount of dollars calculated at the rate of exchange on the date of
payment. According to English practice, if payment is not made by the
debtor, the date of payment is deemed to be the date on which a court
orders execution of the judgment, so that the order can state the amount
of the recovery in sterling.
The fluctuation and volatility of the exchange rate for the U.S. dollar
made it desirable that courts should have the power to express judgments
in a foreign currency, but the basic question is whether indeed there is
no legal impediment to what would be, in effect, a change of traditional
principle. Little, if any, case law can be cited so far in support of the new
principle. The Comment cites in support of section 823 the decision of
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the House of Lords in Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd., 28 a
revolutionary decision that was inspired by the floating character of the
pound sterling and the desire to protect the United Kingdom as a financial
and business center.
Plaintiff's alleged option. Condition (a) noted above means that the
expression of a judgment in the foreign currency indicated in subsection
(I) of section 823 is optional on the part of the plaintiff. The Comment
states that the plaintiff is likely to exercise this option in favor of the
appropriate foreign currency only when the foreign currency has appre-
ciated against the dollar since the claim arose. The option seems to be
based on the idea that it is necessary to ensure that the plaintiff can be
made whole. The thought seems to be that if he had received the foreign
currency when the claim arose, in this first case he would have profited
by receiving a currency that subsequently appreciates. Suppose, however,
that the foreign currency has depreciated since the claim arose. In such
a case, the Comment assumes that the creditor will request a judgment
in dollars. The Comment declares that judgment should be given in such
a case at the rate of exchange applicable on the date the claim arose. In
this second case also, the plaintiff benefits by receiving a currency at a
rate that has appreciated against the foreign currency indicated in sub-
section (1).
The principle of the Comment is that "Neither party should receive a
windfall nor be penalized as a result of currency conversion." It can be
argued, however, that the plaintiff does receive a windfall in the second
case when compared with the first case. The implication of the first case
is that by receiving payment when the claim arose, the plaintiff would
have been in a position to retain a foreign currency that has appreciated.
If the same assumption were made in the second case, the plaintiff would
have retained a foreign currency that has depreciated. The reply might
be that in the second case, the plaintiff could have sold or used the foreign
currency before it depreciated, and could have avoided the effect of the
subsequent depreciation. If, once again, this reasoning were applied to
the first case, the plaintiff would have sold or used the foreign currency,
and not had the benefit of the subsequent appreciation.
It can be questioned, therefore, whether the solution offered by the
Comment is compatible with the principle that neither party should re-
ceive a windfall or be penalized by currency conversion. It does not seem
that both parts of this principle are satisfied by the plaintiff's option.
28. [1971] A.C. 509.
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The question arises whether a better rule is feasible for determining
when judgments should be expressed in a foreign currency, if it is assumed
that such judgments are indeed permitted by law in the United States.
This broad question can be resolved into at least three questions. First,
what are the criteria for deciding whether judgments can be expressed in
a foreign currency'? Second, what are the criteria for choosing the par-
ticular foreign currency in which it is appropriate to express judgments?
Third, if a judgment can be expressed in a foreign currency, must the
court grant such a judgment, or, in other words, has the plaintiff an option,
as stated by the Comment, to claim and receive a judgment in dollars?
The last of these questions will be considered first.
The Reporters' Notes cite Working Paper No. 80 of the English Law
Commission, published in 1981, for the view that experience "appears to
have been favorable" with the English rule, "which entitles the claimant,
in effect, to elect whether he wants the currency of the obligation or the
currency of the forum." The Law Commission's Report on Private In-
ternational Law: Foreign Money Obligations,2 9 published in October 1983,
does not conclude that it is established law that the claimant has an option.
The Report states that, although there is little judicial authority on the
point, a plaintiff should not be able to obtain a judgment expressed in
sterling when the claim ought properly to be expressed in a foreign
currency. 30
[T]o allow the plaintiff to seek judgment in sterling in the case of a foreign-
currency claim would be contrary to the principle in Miliangos. It would be
unjust to the defendant, since the plaintiff would be able to make his claim in
whichever of the two currencies happened to be the more favourable from his
point of view.3 1
Criteria for expression in .foreign currency. The rationale of the Mil-
iangos decision is that it is unfair to the plaintiff and beyond the authority
of the court to transform what is in essence a foreign currency claim into
a sterling claim. The point seems hardly controversial in the case of
contractual claims. The logic of holding that a claim is essentially a foreign
currency claim prevents the plaintiff from electing to transform his claim
so as to obtain a judgment expressed in sterling. To hold otherwise, it is
held, would be unfair to the defendant.
It becomes necessary to decide, therefore, when a claim is in essence
a foreign currency claim. The Restatement appears to accept the view
that there are such claims, even though it does not follow the English
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for the Restatement to declare when a claim can be expressed in a foreign
currency. The criteria of the Restatement, it has been seen, are that the
obligation to be enforced is denominated, or the loss was incurred, in a
foreign currency. It is not clear, however, what effect the earlier part of
subsection (2) of section 823 has on these criteria. Although no problem
is created with respect to the currency of denomination, the question does
arise of the relation of the clause "causes of action arising in another
state" to "the currency in which . . . the loss was incurred."
Denomination in a foreign currency, which apparently would be the
criterion for debts and liquidated damages, creates no problem if the
money of account, in which obligations are measured, and the money of
payment, in which obligations are to be discharged, are the same. Sup-
pose, however, that the money of account is the domestic currency and
the money of payment is a foreign currency. The Law Commission sug-
gests that the English rule is that the judgment should be expressed in
the domestic money of account, namely, sterling. (An argument might be
made, however, for the currency of payment.)
The concept of the loss incurred appears, in the Reporters' Notes, to
cover unliquidated damages for both breach of contract and tort. The
Reporters give some examples drawn exclusively from English cases,
because it follows from the traditional practice of courts in the United
States to give judgments expressed in dollars that there are no American
examples. A more systematic statement could be made of the principles
of English case law than is attempted by the Restatement. For example,
a foreign currency claim exists if the proper law of the contract is English,
and the contract expressly or implicitly designates a foreign currency as
the currency of account and payment. (If the currencies are different, it
has been seen that the Law Commission thinks the currency of account
should be decisive.) If the proper law of the contract is foreign, it would
seem that the question of the currency in which damages should be awarded
would be determined by reference to that law.
If the contract does not expressly or implicitly indicate the currency in
which damages should be awarded for breach, a foreign currency claim
exists if the loss was felt by the plaintiff, or his loss is most truly expressed,
in a foreign currency. These tests do not necessarily mean the currency
in which the plaintiff had to make expenditures because of the breach.
The currency indicated by the tests might be the currency in which the
plaintiff ordinarily conducts his business. If, for example, that currency
is sterling, an English court will hold that a foreign currency claim has
not arisen, even if the plaintiff had to spend dollars or French francs
because of the breach.
The courts take a similar approach in relation to damages for tort, but
it is recognized that a plaintiff might be unable to demonstrate that it
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would be normal for him to use the currency in which he ordinarily
conducts his operations to finance expenditures caused by the tort. In
such a case, the currency in which those expenditures were financed
would be the currency that would determine whether a foreign currency
claim has arisen. The result of the cases is that the circumstances of each
claim to unliquidated damages for breach of contract or tort must be
examined in detail.
It has been seen that according to the Comment on section 823, a
judgment debtor against whom ajudgment expressed in a foreign currency
has been awarded can discharge the debt in dollars at the exchange rate
on the date of payment. This rule would be similar to the English rule,
but the question has been asked whether contracting parties should be
free to provide, if payments are to be made in England, the rate of ex-
change at which the sterling equivalent of a foreign currency is to be
calculated or the date as of which the rate of exchange is to be chosen.
Another question that has arisen is whether contracting parties should be
free to agree, when payment is to be made in England, that it shall be
made exclusively in a stipulated foreign currency without any option for
the debtor to pay the sterling equivalent. The English Law Commission
answered these questions in the affirmative, although there was no direct
authority for the Commission's propositions. 32 If correct, the propositions
would modify the primary rule of English law that if a debt expressed in
a foreign currency is payable in England, the debtor has an option to
discharge the debt in sterling at the rate of exchange on the date of
payment. It is unclear whether the primary rule applies only if the contract
is governed by English law, but the Commission thought that the primary
rule should extend to contracts governed by foreign law.33 The issues
raised in this paragraph are not mentioned by the Restatement.
If contracting parties agree that a debt payable in England must be paid
solely in a stipulated foreign currency, can the judgment be executed in
the foreign currency? On this question, the implications of Choice In-
vestments Ltd. v. Jeromnimon (Midland Bank Ltd., garnishee)34 deserve
consideration. Formerly, only "debts" could be attached to satisfy a debt.
A sum in foreign currency standing to the credit of a judgment debtor
was not regarded as a debt, because foreign currency was a commodity.
In the case referred to here, it was held that the Miliangos decision had
changed the law. The plaintiff was able to garnish a balance in U.S. dollars
standing to the judgment debtor's credit in an account with a London
32. Id. 3.9-. II.
33 d.[ I 2. 1.
34. [19811 1 All E.R. 225
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bank. The decision does not solve the question about satisfaction of a
debt payable in England only in a foreign currency, because the judgment
in Choice was expressed in sterling, and the bank receiving the garnishee
order purchases sterling with the dollars. But Lord Denning, the Master
of the Rolls, stated that the principle of the decision would apply if, for
example, the judgment creditor had a judgment in Swiss francs and the
judgment debtor held a bank balance in dollars. 35 Lord Denning did not
say whether the bank would have to buy Swiss francs with the dollars.
The English Law Commission suggests that, as contracting parties should
be permitted to contract for payment exclusively in a foreign currency,
procedural rules should conform with substantive law. Therefore, courts
should have power to give judgment in the foreign currency, without the
debtor's option to discharge the debt in sterling. The Commission rec-
ognized, however, that enforcement might be difficult. 36
Criteria for choice of foreign currency. Often, the determination that it
is appropriate to express a judgment in a foreign currency will decide the
choice of the appropriate foreign currency as well, but not always. It will
be necessary, therefore, to have criteria to determine what the foreign
currency should be if the facts of a case involve more than one such
currency. The plaintiff may conduct his business in more than one foreign
currency. The consequences of a breach of contract may be loss or ex-
penditure by the plaintiff in a number of foreign currencies.
Some of the English rules mentioned already provide criteria for choos-
ing the appropriate foreign currency. For example, if the money of account
and the money of payment under a contract are both foreign, it seems
that the money of account will be the appropriate currency. For unliqui-
dated damages, the appropriate foreign currency will be the one in which
the plaintiff felt the loss or the one that most truly expresses his loss. If
it is considered proper in a case to award damages in the currencies in
which expenditures were incurred, the expenditures will determine the
currencies. The judgment may have to be expressed in a number of
currencies.
It has become clear in English jurisprudence that the choice of the
currency that will most truly represent the -plaintiff's loss or will most
fully and exactly compensate him for that loss can be controversial. In
Ozalid Group (Export) Ltd. v. African Continental Bank Ltd., 37 the dollar
was both the currency of account and the currency of payment, but the
35. See J. GOLD, SDRS, CURRENCIES, AND GOLD: SIXTH SURVEY of NEW LEGAL DE-
VELOPMENTS 43-63 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 40, 1983), particularly at 44-45.
36. Cmnd. 9064, 5.14-.17, 5.70-.80.
37. [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 231.
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court held that the currency that met the criterion of true loss was sterling.
The court took account of the fact that it was reasonably foreseeable by
the defendant that the plaintiff's true loss would be suffered in sterling.
Conversion rules. If a judgment expressed in a foreign currency is to
be satisfied in dollars, the Restatement provides that the rate of exchange
on the date of payment is to be applied in translating the foreign currency
into dollars. If a judgment is expressed in dollars, the Comment states a
double-barreled rule for translating the foreign currency of obligation into
dollars. If the foreign currency has depreciated since the date of injury
or breach, the rate of exchange on that date should be chosen; if the
foreign currency has appreciated, the rate of exchange on the date of
judgment or payment should be chosen. (Both parts of this rule are pref-
aced with the unexplained clause "Unless the interests require a different
result.") The justification alleged for the rule is again that it puts the
plaintiff into the position he would have had as a result of the defendant's
timely settlement of the claim against him and that it avoids both windfall
and penalty for the parties.
The skepticism expressed already about the plaintiff's option applies
to the rule on conversion. The Reporters recognize that courts in the
United States have not been consistent in their choice of exchange rates.
In Competex S. A. (in Liquidation) v. Ronald La Bow, 38 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals questioned whether the breach-date rule achieved the
neutrality between the parties that the draft Restatement claimed for it.
The court was sympathetic to the proposition advanced by the Restate-
ment that judgments can be expressed in a foreign currency, and thought
that such judgments would be a neutral solution. The court did not assert
that the law was in accord with the proposition, and seems to have doubted
that the plaintiff's option to select the currency of judgment would be
proper if the proposition was good law.
38. 783 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1986); see GOLD, VOLUME I11, supra note 3, at 738-43.
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